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THE SCHOOL FINANCE LANGUAGE OF THE
EDUCATION ARTICLE:
THE CHIMERICAL MANDATE
by

MALCOLM

S.

KAMIN*

INTRODUCTION

For the past several years, a court-made revolution has
been taking place in the field of school finance. In 1971 the
Supreme Court of California decided the now famous case of
Serrano v. Priest,' enunciating the principle that it was unconstitutional for a state to base its system of school financing upon
local property taxes when there were great inconsistencies in

the amount of taxable property from school district to school
district.

Thus, it was held that citizens in the poorer districts,

having less to spend on education than those in the richer districts, were being denied equal protection of the law. This decision was followed in numerous jurisdictions."
In March of 1973, however, the United States Supreme Court

pulled the rug out from under the fledgling revolution in educational financing. In San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez,3 the Court held that the State of Texas did not

violate the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution by
basing its school finance system largely upon local property taxes

from districts of unequal wealth.
While the Rodriguez case would seem to mark the end of

attempts by federal courts to restructure school financing methods, it certainly does not mark the end of the activities of state
* B.A., Yale University; J.D., University of Chicago. Mr. Kamin was a
delegate to the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, serving on the
Education Committee. He is a partner in the firm of Arvey, Hodes &
Mantynband.
I Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971).
2 Among others: Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist.,
337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1972), rev'd, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973); Van
Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971) ; Milliken v. Green,
389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super.
223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972); Sweetwater County Planning Comm. v. Hinkle,
491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971). Contra, Spano v. Bd. of Educ., 68 Misc. 2d
804, 328 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct 1972).
For the most complete discussion of the rationale underlying Serrano
see COONS, CLUNE & SUSERMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
(1970).
For the most complete discussion of the problems involved in the
Serrano decision see Symposium - Serrano: Public School Finance, 2 ILL.
L.F. 215 (1972).
3 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278
(1973).
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courts in this area. Although the Rodriguez reasoning is likely
to be determinative where state courts have only their state
equal protection clauses to rely upon, the question is more complex where the state constitution has an article dealing with
education. The state constitution may contain an independent
basis for reaching a Serrano-like result, without resort to equal
4
protection principles.
The new Illinois constitution is particularly intriguing in
this regard. The Education Article of the 1970 Constitution
provides - "The State, has the primary responsibilityfor financing the system of public education. ' 5 This single sentence was
the total response of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention
to the massive problems confronting school finance.6
The first public attempts to grapple with the meaning of this
sentence are reflected in the report of the Finance Task Force
of the Governor's Commission on Schools., In attempting to restructure the state's system of educational finance, the Task
Force was required to seek direction from the school finance
language of the new constitution. A majority of the Task Force
(over strong dissent) decided that the language was merely
hortatory, an exhortation to greater efforts by the state, but not
a legally binding mandate that state school appropriations surpass local levies. Thus, the Task Force. recommended continued
reliance on local property taxation to finance schools. The dissenters asserted that the constitutional language was not hortatory, but they failed to establish a substantive basis for such a
conclusion.8
The Task Force anticipated judicial construction of the
constitutional language. They did not have long to wait. On
September 25, 1973, the Illinois Supreme Court decided the case
of Blase v. State of Illinois. The plaintiffs in Blase (the Mayor
of Niles, Illinois, a Chicago School Board member, and the Superintendent of the Cook County Educational Service Region)
4 See Robinson

v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972),

relying in part upon the state constitutional requirement of a "thorough and
efficient"
system of education.
5
ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (1970).
6 Had Serrano been decided prior to the convention (Dec. 1969-Sept.
1970), the convention certainly would have spent more time examining the
problems. The total amount of time spent in debating the subject before
the full convention on three different occasions could not have exceeded
three hours.
7 FINANCE TASK FORCE, GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON SCHOOLS, A NEW
DESIGN:

(1972).

FINANCING

FOR EFFECTIVE EDUCATION IN

ILLINOIS,

FINAL REPORT

(For a different approach to school financing, containing little

discussion of the constitutional language, see

SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC
INSTRUCTION'S ADVISORY COMM., SCHOOL FINANCING REFORT, ILL. (1973)).
8 FINANCE TASK FORCE, GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON SCHOOLS, A NEw
DESIGN: FINANCING FOR EFFECTIVE EDUCATION IN ILLINOIS, FINAL REPORT,

at 166-69 (1972).

9 Blase v. State, No. 45273 (Ill. Sup. Ct., Sept. 25, 1973).
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had sued the state seeking to require it to provide not less than
50% of the funds needed to operate elementary and secondary
public schools. The court, relying upon the record of the proceedings of the convention of 1970, held that the language was
merely hortatory - "that the sentence was intended only to
express a goal or objective, and not to state a specific command."'"
In holding that the final sentence of the first section of the
new Education Article is hortatory, the court omitted further
construction of the language and thereby failed to shed any
light on its substantive meaning. Even if the sentence only
states an unenforceable goal, it is still necessary to determine
what that goal is; for every attempt to structure or restructure
the system of school financing in Illinois should be measured
against the goals stated in the Education Article of the 1970
Constitution.
This article will seek to explore the debates and the history
of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention from which the
school finance language evolved. If this analysis yields an understanding of the substantive meaning of the sentence, it should be
of aid to those who seek to continue the fight against inequality
in educational opportunity." :
1
An understanding of the school finance language of the 1970
Constitution begins with an examination of section 1 of the new
Education Article, to which the school finance language was appended. Section 1 provides:
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational
development of all persons to the limits of their capacities.
The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality
public educational institutions and services. Education in public
schools through the secondary level shall be free. There may be
such other free education as the General Assembly provides by law.
The State has the primary responsibility for financing the
system of public education.12
It seems fair to say that this section is as utopian and
idealistic in scope as any in the new constitution, including the
THE EDUCATION ARTICLE -

10 Id
11 The

SECTION

author, having served on the Education Committee of the Illinois
Constitutional Convention, recognizes the difficulty of maintaining pure objectivity in analyzing and reporting debates, both on and off the record, in
which he took part. In the hope that this article will have some historical
as well as critical value, subjective impressions will occasionally be recorded,
where conversations or perceived motivations or intentions are dehors the
record. It is hoped that the reader will also recognize the author's involvement in and commitment to the work of the Education Committee and
forgive his occasional subjectivity and hyperbole.
12 ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (1970).
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To fully appreciate the section's potential, it must

be compared to the first section of article VIII of the old constitution.
The Education Article of the 1870 Constitution called for
the general assembly to provide "a thorough and efficient system of free schools, whereby all children of the state may receive
a good common school education. ' 14 Although this language
sounds like a "mere" mandate, an expression of sentiment rather
5
than a judicially enforceable limitation on legislative power,1
the Illinois courts have nevertheless used the language to strike
down certain acts of school boards. Thus, the requirement of
"efficiency" has been used to prevent a school district from splitting itself into noncontiguous parts to avoid encompassing a poor
area16 as well as to render teachers' strikes illegal.' 7 "Free" has
been employed to strike tuition charges.18 "All children" has
been utilized in place of the equal protection clause to prevent
racial segregation." And the meaning of "common school" has
been considered as a possible limitation upon the establishment
20
of free high schools and junior colleges.
As spelled out in the 1970 Education Committee's first report to the convention 2 ' the committee plainly intended to enlarge the scope of state responsibility in the field of education
beyond the dimensions indicated by the Constitution of 1870.
Thus, the words "educational development . ..to the limits of

their capacities," which are indicative of an augmented state
responsibility are to be contrasted with the old concept of the
"common school," which limited state responsibility to eighth.
13
We, the People of the State of Illinois - grateful to Almighty
God for the civil, political and religious liberty which He has permitted
us to enjoy and seeking His blessing upon our endeavors - in order to
provide for the health, safety and welfare of the people; maintain a
representative and orderly government; eliminate poverty and inequality;
assure legal, social and economic justice; provide opportunity for the
fullest development of the individual; insure domestic tranquility; provide for the common defense; and secure the blessings of freedom and
liberty to ourselves and our posterity - do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the State of Illinois.
ILL. CONST. Preamb. (1970).
14 ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1870).
15 For a more complete
discussion of mandates and limitations see
Kamin, ConstitutionalAbolition of Ad Valorem Personal Property Taxes: A
Looking Glass Book, 60 ILL. B.J. 432 (1972).
16 People ex rel. Leighty v. Young, 301 Ill. 67, 133 N.E. 693 (1921).
17 Bd. of Educ. v. Federation of Teachers Local 886, 46 Ill. 2d 439,
264 N.E.2d 18 (1970); Bd. of Educ. v. Redding, 32 I1. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d
427 (1965).
18 Segar v. Bd. of Educ., 317 Ill. 418, 148 N.E. 289 (1925); People
v. Moore, 240 Ill. 408, 88 N.E. 979 (1909).
19 People ex rel. Longress v. Bd. of Educ., 101 Ill. 308 (1882).
20 Fiedler v. Eckfeldt, 335 Ill. 11, 166 N.E. 504
(1929) ; Russell v.
High School Bd. of Educ., 212 11. 327, 72 N.E. 441 (1904).
21 REc. OF PROC., SIXTH ILL. CONST. CONV., Committee Proposals,Vol. VI
at 223-89 (1969-70) [hereinafter cited as Committee Proposals; Member
Proposals; Verbatim Transcripts].
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grade or, at the most, high school. This new provision requires
state concern with more than just "common school education."
Illinois must now be concerned with "educational development"
wherever it may be found.
The words "limits of their capacities" was an expansion
of the state's responsibility in another way, as well. Not only
do the limits of individual capacities establish the goals of the
state within the accepted school system, but the 1970 Constitution recognizes that persons with physical and mental handicaps
are educable and should be educated to the limits of their own
capacities. Moreover, the state's concern should not cease after
high school. Even where the state does not provide "free" education, the new Education Article indicates the state must furnish a "system" which offers every individual educational development to the limits of his capacity, regardless of his relationship
to established "schools."
In a similar vein, 1970 schools should be of "high quality,"
not merely the "good" schools of 1870. And the reference to
"educational institutions and services" seeks to extend the state's
responsibilities beyond the walls of "schools." Higher education establishments, libraries, pre-school programs, adult and
continuing education, indeed support for educational activity
wherever it may be found, are all potentially within the state
system of institutions and services which now extend beyond
traditional limits.
An examination of the Education Committee report underlying its first proposal reveals that the committee understood the
first sentence of section 1 to be hortatory language, not directly
enforceable by the courts. The committee recognized that the
proposed language of section 1 was of a type more appropriate
to a preamble, where the broad purposes behind a constitution
are disclosed.2 2 Thus, the language establishing the educational
objectives of the state was recognized as precatory, expressly
designating a goal, albeit an unobtainable one.
In contrast, the language which the committee intended to
express a clear limitation upon state action was that which mandates a free education through the secondary level. The second
sentence of the second paragraph was intended to be a limitation
in the same way the courts had enforced similar language under
the 1870 Constitution. It would therefore be clearly unconstitutional for the General Assembly to require students to pay tuition
for elementary or secondary education. The last sentence of the
second paragraph was added to insure that the requirement of
free education through this secondary level could not be inter22 Note 13 supra.
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preted as a limitation upon the General Assembly's power to
provide free education beyond the secondary level.
It is also fair to say that the convention apparently understood and agreed with the Education Committee's proposal and
report for section 1. Through second reading, the convention
made only one substantive change in the body of the Education
Committee's original proposal. 23 The committee's intention that
education be "the paramount" goal of the state was softened to
"a fundamental" goal.
On third reading, however, one additional change was made.
The school financing sentence was added. This language was
not the product of any committee, and thus had no detailed committee report to explain its purposes. Consequently, any understanding of the school financing sentence requires an examination
of its evolution in the course of the convention.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCHOOL FINANCING LANGUAGE

The procedure adopted for the initial introduction of an idea
to the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention was by way of
member proposal. For the first few months of the convention,
delegates were permitted to put any idea in proposal form for
submission to the appropriate committee. There were only four
member proposals directed toward educational financing.
Member proposal No. 32 by Delegate Knuppel provided for
a state-wide income tax for educational purposes only. School
districts would be prohibited from levying a property tax for
educational purposes except for "building purposes," i.e., for
operating expenditures as distinguished from capital expendi24
tures.
Member proposal No. 434, submitted by your author, was
to the same effect as proposal No. 32, except that it did not
require a specific source of state funds; nor did it draw the appropriate distinction between operating expenditures and capital
2
expenditures. 5
Member proposal No. 519, by Delegate Leahy, was somewhat more complicated. It required the General Assembly to
appropriate sufficient funds to enable any school district, after
adding the state money to its own local levy, to expend as much
per pupil as the average expenditure of the wealthiest districts
" Committee Proposals, vol. VI at 325-34 sets forth the committee's
suggested changes on style and drafting.
24 Member Proposals, vol. VII at 2854.
25 Id.
at 3044. This proposal was for an entire education article, as
drafted by the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago. The relevant
financing language provided: "Funds for the public schools shall be appropriated by the General Assembly and no local governmental unit may levy
taxes or appropriate funds for educational purposes."
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i.e., the average expenditure of the upper 25% of districts
in each class, when measured by per pupil expenditures. The
Leahy proposal expressly permitted any school district to
spend whatever it desired, on the theory that such a course of
action would serve only to increase the level of expenditure of
the upper 25%.2-G
The final member proposal, No. 570, was by Delegate Netsch.
This called for the state to assure "equal educational opportunity
to every child" and went on to provide:
The State has the primary duty to finance the public school system.
The State may provide for the establishment of local school districts
as it deems necessary for purposes of administration and opera27
tion, or financing, or both.
All member proposals were submitted on or before March 3, 1970,
and were thereafter transmitted to the Education Committee.
The committee initially concentrated its efforts on developing a basic statement of goals, establishing the State Board
of Education and the question of aid to parochial schools. Education Committee Proposal No. 1, covering these subjects, was
filed with the convention on April 14, 1970,28 and debated on
first reading between April 22 and May 6. Little was said about
school financing at that time.
Throughout the latter part of May and into June and July,
the Education Committee interviewed witnesses on the subject
of school financing. The committee itself was divided. Some
thought that the constitution should be silent on the subject of
school financing. Others who believed it was necessary to address the problem, strongly disagreed over what to say. The
catalyst which precipitated action by a majority of the committee members was the sudden announcement on Saturday, July 18,
that no committee reports could be filed after Wednesday, July
22.29 Since the Education Committee believed that it was the only
substantive committee still meeting, there was a general feeling
that the deadline was an attempt to stifle further discussion of
educational financing. Thus, the desire to get a report to the
floor, and thereby. air the issue, superseded the importance of
resolving differences within the committee. Accordingly, the
report was filed on the day of the deadline after a 6-5 vote in
committee, but was not reached for debate until August 4.
Education Committee Proposal No. 2 was a variation of the
2(
27

Id. at 3077-78.

Id. at 3100-01.

28 Committee Proposals,vol. VI at 223-89.
21 Verbatim Transcripts,vol. IV at 2849-51.
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Welfare Council proposal. The committee proposal provided:
To meet the goals of Section 1, substantially all funds for the
operational costs of the free public schools shall be appropriated by
the General Assembly for the benefit of the local school districts.
No local governmental unit or school district may levy taxes or
appropriate funds for the purposes of such educational operation
except to the extent of ten percent (10%) of the amount3 0received
by that district from the General Assembly in that year.
As the committee report for proposal No. 2 explained, the
majority had come to the conclusion that the only way to achieve
anything approximating equal educational opportunity through
an enforceable constitutional limitation was to require the state
to provide substantially all of the financing and to prohibit
wealthy local school districts from taking much advantage of
their local tax base. The theory supporting the proposal was that
the wealthier districts would be forced to seek increased state
expenditures for all students, in order to continue the local levels
of expenditure to which they had become accustomed. The difficulty of framing a constitutional limitation on power as distinguished from a hortatory statement was stressed in debateA1
Before debating the majority proposal, two amendments
were advocated by members of the Education Committee minority. Delegate Clyde Parker proposed a formula calling for
the General Assembly to appropriate and distribute on a per
pupil basis an amount equal to 90% of the total cost of public
education, as determined by the new State Board of Education.
Local districts would be permitted to decide by referendum
whether to tax locally to achieve 100% of their necessary budgets.3 2 Delegate Bottino would have limited local expenditures
to 50%, thus requiring the state to pay at least 50% of the
costs. 3 3 Both formula proposals were rejected with little debate.
Although the majority proposal was understood as a formula approach, calling for 90% state financing of education, it
was not truly such an approach. The proposal required that
the state provide substantially all school financing. Under such
circumstances, the state would have to make a determination that
the money it was furnishing was substantially all that was necessary to provide the "high quality" education called for in the
first paragraph of section 1. It followed that the state need not
Committee Proposals,vol. VI at 291-323, see also note 25 supra.
Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 3537.
32 Id. at 3547-48.
33 Id. at 3550-51. It always struck the author as peculiar that Delegates
C. Parker and Bottino offered the only language calling for a specified percentage of state financing, yet they signed the minority report to Educational
Committee Proposal No. 2, stating: "The minority does not favor the incorporation of state financing requirements in the Constitution."
See
Committee Proposals, vol. VI at 304.
30

31
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have required nor expected any level of local expenditure. The
3
majority proposal was also defeated; the vote was 69-38. 4
Although the majority proposal was unsuccessful in generating enough votes for passage, it was successful in eliciting
a convention response which reflected the attitude of delegates
toward the subject of school financing. The debate on the school
finance issue on first reading suggested that the convention was
far from ready to force the majority solution upon the citizens
of suburbia. If the limitation on local spending were eliminated,
there was substantial sentiment for the first sentence of the
committee proposal. However, the president of the convention
would not allow the question to be put to the delegates at that
time. He ruled an attempt to divide the question out of order. 35
It was also obvious that the delegates were of a negative persuasion regarding any formula approach to school financing, be
it as great as 90% state financing or as little as 50% state financing.
On second reading, on August 13, Delegate Netsch proposed
as a new section 4 of the Education Article the first sentence
of her member proposal; "The State has the primary duty to
finance the system of public educational institutions and services." 36 In explaining the proposal she said:
I concede that the language I have put down is, in the Convention's usual fashion, hortatory. I do not believe that it states
a legally enforceable duty on the part of the State through the
General Assembly or otherwise. I do not intend that it states a
legally enforceable duty.3 In response to a question of whether the "primary duty"
language created the same problem as the rejected "paramount"
language of section 1, Delegate Netsch made it clear that " 'primary' is intended to modify whose duty, rather than which of
the State's duties is first among equals."' ,, In response to another question, her position was further clarified: "it is at the
state's level that the responsibility lies, not at the local level."' 9
In order to further clarify the language, the proposal was
amended to substitute the word "responsibility" for the word
,,duty.,,P4o
In the course of the debate on the Netsch proposal, the convention discussed a substitute proposal by Delegate Bottino,
similar to the proposal he had offered on first reading. This
4 Verbatim Transcripts, vol. IV at 3570.
Id. at 3567.
36 Verbatim Transcripts, vol. V at 4145.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 4146.
3

39

10

Id. at 4147.

Id.
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proposal called for the General Assembly to provide "substantial
. . . "
parity of educational opportunity throughout the state
and that local school districts would be limited to raising 50%
of the funds for education. 4' Both the Bottino and Netsch proposals were then rejected by the convention, Bottino on a voice
vote and Netsch by a vote of 47-38.42
Third reading for the Education Article occurred on August
31, 1970, three days before the convention adjourned. Delegate
Netsch again offered the same language that had been defeated
eighteen days earlier.4 3 This time she had sixty-eight signed
"co-sponsors. ' 44 But the various co-sponsors had different ideas
about what they were sponsoring.
Delegate Netsch began by explaining that this was the same
proposal as submitted earlier, and that "it [was] intended primarily to state the commitment of this Convention that the State
responsibility for the financing of
should be assuming a greater
' 45
the public school system.
At this point, Delegate Pughsley, one of the principal cosponsors, interjected her impression that Delegate Netsch's use
of the word "greater" was a substitution for "primary," and if
so, she wanted to withdraw from sponsorship of the amendment.
Delegate Pughsley explained that her understanding of "primary" meant "total responsibility. '46 She withdrew her objection after being assured that the word "primary" was still
in the proposal as drafted.
Delegate Netsch then went on to explain that her proposal
sought to put the convention on record indicating the opinion of
the delegates that real estate taxes were carrying too much of
the education burden, causing enormous inequality of spending
among school districts. She said:
It is not a legally obligatory command to the State legislature.
I think it is useful, because I think it is something that can be
pointed to every time the question of appropriation from the
State to the school districts is at issue ... That the people of this
State also share the feeling47 that the State should be paying a
larger share of that burden.
At this point in the debate, your author proposed an amendment (the Kamin amendment) providing:
The State shall undertake to provide substantially all funds for the
41 Id. at 4145.
42 Id. at 4148.
4 Id. at 4500.
44 Id.
45 Id.

at 4501.
at 4500-01.

46Id. at 4501.
47 Id. at 4502.
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financing of the48 free public schools from revenues other than real
property taxes.
It was explained that this amendment, while hortatory, sought
to remedy some of the vagueness of the Netsch amendment. I
summed up discussions with the Netsch amendment co-sponsors
as follows:
There were some who thought that it, in fact, creates a legal standard and that a local property taxpayer might well be able to make
out a case in court to the effect that his property taxes are too
great, since the State has not yet undertaken the primary responsibility for financing the system. There were others who suggested that .4 .. it is, in fact, no direction to the state to increase
financial aid. 1
The Kamin amendment sought to eliminate some of the
uncertainties of the Netsch amendment by attempting to make
it clear that the state should provide financing from its revenues,
other than real property taxes, and that the financing was for
the free public schools as distinguished from other educational
services. In addition, the proposal sought to provide a higher
standard of hortatory objective by calling for substantially all
funds to come from the state. 50
The debate on the Kamin amendment revealed the depth of
confusion over the meaning of the Netsch proposal. Thus, Delegate Raby condemned the Kamin amendment because it was a
mere hortatory statement." It is clear that he thought that the
Netsch amendment was not hortatory, which possibility I con52
firmed.
Delegate Connor, on the other hand, opposed the Kamin
amendment because it specified a "change in a historic pattern
of financing education in this State." To Delegate Connor, the
Netsch amendment did not really call for any change, since he
placed his emphasis on the word "responsibility." "How they
go about delivering on that responsibility is up to the State. It
could delegate it to the local communities. If not done properly,
it would be done through State alternatives. '
Thus, Delegate
Connor thought of "responsibility" in the supervising or policymaking sense, which was already spelled out in the first part of
section 1. The "previous question" was then moved and debate
on the Kamin amendment was parliamentarily curtailed. The
5
amendment was later defeated. 4
Further debate on the Netsch amendment was limited.
48

Id.

49 Id.
50 Id. at 4501, 4503, 4505.

51Id. at 4504.
52 Id.
53

Id.

54 Id.

at 4505.

Dele-
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gate Bottino confirmed his thinking that the language was hortatory.5 5 Delegate Pughsley declared that the state has the basic
responsibility to educate its future citizens. Delegate Friedrich,
speaking in opposition to the amendment, stated that the language might not be hortatory and that his understanding indicated that the state had to pay over half of the cost of state
education.56
With no further debate, the Netsch amendment was adopted
by a vote of 65-28 and the third paragraph was appended to
section 17
CONSTRUING THE SCHOOL FINANCIAL LANGUAGE

It is well established that the proceedings of a constitutional
convention should not be employed to construe clear and unambiguous language.5 8 On the other hand, convention proceedings
may be examined to determine the meaning of provisions which
'
are "thought to be doubtful."51
The court in the Blase case apparently thought the meaning of the school financing language
was doubtful, for they resorted to the convention proceedings
without even pausing to consider what the language meant on
its face. ° However, it is difficult to argue that the school financing language on its face is not sufficiently ambiguous to justify
resort to the convention proceedings. Virtually every word is
ambiguous. What is "The State"? Is it any one branch of
government or all three? Does "primary" mean that financing
education is the principle responsibility of the state as distinct
from its other responsibilities or does "primary" mean that it is
the "state," as distinct from some other governmental unit, which
has the principle responsibility for financing education? Does
"responsibility" mean undertaking action and thus appropriating money, or merely supervising policy?
If the foregoing terminology could be construed to import,
in effect, that the "General Assembly must raise at least 50% of
the cost of financing the system of public education," what costs
and what system are referred to? Does "financing the system"
mean all costs or only operating costs? Does "system" of public
education mean just the public elementary and secondary schools
or does it include other institutions as well?
All of these questions are raised by the language of section
55 Id. at
56 Id.
57Id.

4506.

58 People ex rel. Watseka Tel. Co. v. Emmerson, 302 Il. 300, 134 N.E.
707 (1922).
51People ex 'el. Keenan v. McGuane, 13 Ill.2d 520, 527, 150 N.E.2d
168, 172 (1958).
60 Blase v. State, No. 45273 (Ill. Sup. Ct., Sept. 25, 1973).
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1 on its face. Unfortunately, the convention proceedings, as set
forth earlier, render little guidance for resolving them. As previously noted, the school financing language of the new constitution was a floor amendment with no explanatory written report.
The principal sponsor, Delegate Netsch, said little to resolve the
substantive ambiguities. Since she clearly considered her proposal to be hortatory, she apparently was not as concerned with
the precision of the language as she might have been if she had
intended to state a legally binding limitation on state power. She
did assert, although on second reading when her language was rejected, that "primary responsibility" meant "State" responsibility as distinguished from "local" responsibility and was not
a ranking of the state's responsibilities. Beyond this assertion,
she failed to truly clarify the meaning of her words.
It seems clear that Delegates Pughsley and Connor understood "primary" in a different sense from Delegate Netsch. 61 Yet
they both co-sponsored the proposal. 12 There is nevertheless no
way to poll the delegates to determine whose understanding they
relied upon in casting their votes. The inescapable conclusion is
that the record of the proceedings concerning the school financing
language is almost as ambiguous as the language itself. There
simply is no definitive "intent" to be gleaned from the debates.
Indeed, one must question the Illinois Supreme Court's reliance upon the debates to determine the "hortatory" nature of the
language. This author knows of no authority for the proposition
that the expressed intent of the principal sponsor of an amendment of necessity becomes the intent of the body adopting the
amendment. And while this principle has plausibility if there is
no debate on the subject beyond that of the sponsor, it is implausible where other co-sponsors express an intention different
from that of the principal sponsor.
Since it is clear that Delegate Pughsley thought the language was more than hortatory63 as did Delegate Raby64 and
since your author and Delegate Friedrich acknowledged the possibility that the language was not hortatory," it is not clear that
the convention relied upon Delegate Netsch's explanations alone.
It almost seems that the school financing language of the new
61

Verbatim Transcripts,vol. V at 4501.

62 Id. at 4504.

133Id. at 4501. It is significant in this regard to note that Delegate
Pughsley voted against adoption of the entire Education Article on second
reading, saying "I do not feel the education article, the committee, now the

convention, addressed itself to the serious educational problems of the State
of Illinois." See Verbatim Transcripts, vol. V at 4149. The only difference
between the Education Article as passed on second reading and that finally
adopted was the addition of the school financing language.
64 Verbatim Transcripts, vol. V at 4504.
65 Id. at 4504, 4506.
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constitution is thus an appropriate subject for Justice Frankfurter's waggish canon of construction "when the legislative
history is doubtful, go to the statute,"'" even though it was the
ambiguity of the section which justified the initial examination of
the debates.
A construction of the language in the context of the entire
Education Article and the rest of the 1970 Constitution can be
made. As will be seen, that construction of necessity yields the
result that the language is hortatory, even if Delegate Netsch
had not said so.
The key to the construction of the educational financing
language is the Local Government Article, article VII. In section 1, school districts are expressly excluded from the definition
of "units of local government." Thus, it must be recognized that
school districts are "the State," as distinct from "units of local
government." Since school districts are creations of the General Assembly, as part of the state "system of public educational
institutions," called for in article X, the financing language cannot reasonably be interpreted to affect taxing by local school districts. Rather, the language in this context can only be read to
mandate that the state not rely upon units of local government to
finance education.
Further, the language cannot be read as only addressing itself to the financing of elementary and secondary education. As
spelled out above,67 the "system of public educational institutions
and services" called for in section 1 of article X is open-ended.
If university and other services for which tuition is charged
were greatly expanded, the General Assembly could appropriate
100% of elementary and secondary educational costs and still not
be financing 50% of the system. On the other hand, by providing
free college and graduate education, the state could theoretically finance more than half of the educational costs in the state,
and not appropriate anything for elementary and secondary education.
Thus, the goal is not that the state provide any fixed level of
financing for education. Rather, "primary responsibility" must
mean that Illinois should provide that level of financing which
insures the high-quality system called for in the second paragraph of section 1.
In other words, Illinois will have met its responsibility to
finance education only when it has financed a system capable of
meeting the goals announced in the rest of section 1. Since
those goals are acknowledgedly hortatory, it follows that the last
66 Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 374 (1956).
67

See pages 334, 335 supra.
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sentence is hortatory as well; for it is extremely doubtful that
the concept of "high-quality education" is capable of judicial
definition, much less judicial enforcement. Such a construction
not only furnishes a reasonable meaning to all of the words of
the final sentence of section 1 of the Education Article, but also
accords with other provisions of the 1970 Constitution.

CONCLUSION

Admittedly, the mandate as thus stated seems more of a
prayer than a command. Yet, from an historical viewpoint, it
is an appropriate supplication. The convention recognized the
problems of inequality in educational opportunity and the inequities in financing education through real estate taxes. The
convention delegates, like the Supreme Court in Rodriguez, deplored the situation, but were unable to develop a workable solution to impose upon the Illinois General Assembly.
Ironically, the very presence of the school finance language
may constitute an impediment to court reform of educational
financing. If the Illinois school financing system is further
challenged in the courts, 8 the new equal protection clause in the
Illinois Bill of Rights,6 9 together with the "efficient system"
language of the Educational Article, should compel a Serrano-like
result. Such a result could fail to materialize solely because an
Illinois court reasons that the convention, having addressed itself
to school finance in the last sentence of section 1 of article X,
did not intend any other provisions of the new constitution
to control school financing. That would be a strong blow to the advocates of equal educational opportunity. Yet, such reasoning
is not beyond the range of possibility.
Hopefully, such a case will not be necessary. If the legislature and the new State Board of Education will take the school
financing language for what it is - the statement of a pressing
problem and the urgent prayer for a fair solution - then they
will act to equalize educational opportunity and the tax burdens
of educational financing without further judicial intervention.

68 The Blase case did not address itself to the general constitutionality
of the Illinois school financing system. The attack was limited to the
requirement of the school financing language.
69 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1970).
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